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In 1899, George H. Williams, who once had been President
Ulysses Grant's Attorney General, reminisced about his appearances
before the Supreme Court.1 Although he was not admitted to practice
before the Court until 1865, he observed some of its sessions in the
mid-1850s. 2 Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, who he never saw after this
period, left quite an impression on the young lawyer.3 Some of Taney's
colleagues, however, like Justices Peter V. Daniel and John Catron,
did not stand out in Williams's memory. Indeed, Williams's remarks
concerning Catron proved quite brief: "I ... have no very distinct
impressions as to Catron."
4
A century has passed since Williams published that remark,
but the line adequately reflects the contemporary understanding of
Justice Catron, who remains an obscure figure in the Court's history.
Unlike many of his colleagues-Roger Taney,5 Joseph Story,6 Peter V.
Associate Professor of History, University of Houston-Downtown. I would like to
express my thanks to Jim Ely and Mark Brandon for inviting me to participate in this
Symposium, to Al Brophy, Tim Huebner, Ted Brown, and John Grubb for their comments on this
paper, and to Andrew Edward Smith for his editorial patience.
1. George H. Williams, Reminiscences of the United States Supreme Court, 8 YALE L.J.
296, 296-305 (1899).
2. Id. at 296.
3. See id. (noting that the Chief Justice's appearance was "still daguerreotyped upon [his]
memory").
4. Id.
5. E.g., CHARLES W. SMITH, ROGER B. TANEY, JACKSONIAN JURIST (1935); CARL BRENT
SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935).
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Daniel,7 John Campbell,8 John McLean, 9 and even James M.
WayneI 0-Catron never has been the subject of a book-length
biography.11 But scholars have not ignored him completely, either.
Timothy Huebner, in his study of the Southern Judicial Tradition,
devoted a chapter to Catron's tenure on the Tennessee Supreme
Court,1 2 and book-length histories of the Taney Court give Catron an
obligatory biographical snippet. 13 Catron also plays a bit role in
various studies of the Dred Scott case for which he is remembered
both as the Justice who wrote to President-Elect James Buchanan,
asking him to sway the vote of Justice Robert C. Grier, 14 and as the
author of a rather quirky concurring opinion that rejected many of
Chief Justice Taney's arguments.' 5 Beyond those instances, as
Williams noted more than one hundred years ago, Catron did not
leave many distinct impressions.
16
6. E.g., GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1970); JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1971); R. KENT
NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC (1986).
7. E.g., JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V. DANIEL,
1784-1860 (1964).
8. E.g., ROBERT SAUNDERS, JR., JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL, SOUTHERN MODERATE, 1811-
1889 (1997).
9. E.g., FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN ON THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1937).
10. E.g., ALEXANDER A. LAWRENCE, JAMES MOORE WAYNE: SOUTHERN UNIONIST (1943).
11. Unlike many of his Taney Court colleagues, Catron left behind no collection of papers
suitable to serve as a basis for a full-length biography.
12. TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE JUDGES AND
SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890, at 40-69 (1999) [hereinafter HUEBNER, SOUTHERN
JUDICIAL TRADITION]; see also Theodore Brown, Jr., The Formative Period in the History of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1796-1835, in A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT 1, 1-
60 (James W. Ely, Jr. ed., 2002).
13. See TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE TANEY COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 66-72
(2003) [hereinafter HUEBNER, TANEY COURT] (providing the best brief introduction to the Taney
Court).
14. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS 311-12 (1978) (discussing Catron's effort to get Buchanan to help him entice a
northerner into the Dred Scott majority); Drew E. Edwards, Judicial Misconduct and Politics in
the Federal System: A Proposal for Revising the Judicial Councils Act, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1071,
1073-74 (1987) (discussing the correspondence between President-Elect Buchanan and Justices
Catron and Grier).
15. See AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE: JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1837-1857, at 195-96 (2006) (discussing Justice Catron's arguments
and other Justices' responses thereto); Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the
Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 345 (1988) (discussing Catron's use of the Comity
Clause in his proslavery argument); Robert R. Russel, Constitutional Doctrines with Regard to
Slavery in the Territories, 32 J. S. HIST. 466, 478 (1966) (describing Catron's argument for
slavery based on the fundamental condition of the equality of the states and noting its similarity
to the Calhoun doctrine).
16. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
JOHN CATRON
Two factors, aside from a lack of collected papers, explain the
relative scholarly neglect of Justice Catron. First, Catron tended to
specialize in common law cases, particularly property disputes. He
had served as a judge on the Tennessee Supreme Court from 1824
until 1835 and had developed a considerable background in
adjudicating such cases. Second, Catron often spoke for the Court in
cases that involved complex technical matters, which rarely attracted
public interest. When the Court heard the notorious inheritance case
involving Myra Clark Gaines-the longest American legal dispute of
the nineteenth century, one charged with sexual scandal that the
press found enticing-Catron wrote one of the opinions. 17 These sorts
of disputes, however, do not attract the same amount of scholarly
attention as do constitutional cases, and Catron wrote relatively few
opinions on such matters. Even in cases concerning slavery, an issue
that deeply engaged the Taney Court, Catron often remained silent,
18
and that stance contributed to his obscurity. But Catron did vote in
such cases, and he generally sided with the majority.
This pattern of voting accounts for the second factor leading to
the neglect of Justice Catron. During his tenure on the Supreme Court
(1837-1865), Catron shared with a majority of his colleagues a set of
assumptions that I label "Jacksonian jurisprudence." These
assumptions manifested themselves in public law decisions as an
effort to enforce an amoral vision of collective self-rule that gave state
legislatures great latitude in determining their own policy. In private
law decisions, however, they appeared as an attempt to inculcate
among citizens an individuated self-rule by imposing a market-
oriented morality on the litigants who appeared before the Court.' 9
Through this framework, the Justices worked to reconcile the Taney
Court's conflicting commitments to national and state sovereignty, to
the protection of slavery, and to the promotion of economic
development. Catron's opinions on both the Supreme Court of
Tennessee and the U.S. Supreme Court underscore a wholehearted
embrace of these assumptions. Because he shared these beliefs with
his colleagues, however, Justice Catron often voted silently in cases
17. Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472, 505 (1852); see also ELIZABETH URBAN
ALEXANDER, NOTORIOUS WOMAN: THE CELEBRATED CASE OF MYRA CLARK GAINES 210 (2001)
(discussing Justice Catron's opinion in this case and how it reflected his Southern biases).
18. See William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition before the United States Supreme Court,
1820-1860, 65 J. AM. HIST. 34, 45, 51 n.63 (1978) (noting Catron's silence in two of the Court's
major slavery decisions, although one was due to illness).
19. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 10-12 (discussing the Taney Court's reluctance to interfere
with matters it considered legislative and its insistence that individuals act as sovereigns in
conducting their daily affairs).
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expressing them, and consequently, he never distinguished himself as
a major figure on the Court. Nonetheless, his presence helped fill in
the majority that shaped the Court's direction under Chief Justice
Taney.
This Article argues that Justice Catron's acceptance of the
general premises of the Court's Jacksonian jurisprudence accounts for
his obscurity. Part One demonstrates that Catron articulated a
similar framework while serving on the Tennessee Supreme Court.
Part Two illustrates his continued support for that framework after he
moved to the U.S. Supreme Court. Part Three, however, demonstrates
that, although he embraced much of the Taney Court's jurisprudence,
Catron did not move in lockstep with his colleagues. Indeed, the
elements he emphasized within that framework-namely, support for
state sovereignty and equality as well as an aversion to judicial
policymaking-led him to break briefly with his colleagues' thinking
in the mid-1850s. Even then, Catron failed to stand out as a
prominent Justice.
I. JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE ON THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT
Although he came from a relatively modest background-at
least when compared to other Supreme Court Justices 20-Catron
became a prominent figure in Tennessee politics in the 1820s and
1830s. He served in the U.S. Army under the command of Andrew
Jackson during the 1810s and then turned his attention to the
practice of law and the pursuit of political office. 21 By the 1820s, he
had married into a prominent Democratic family, moved into General
Jackson's neighborhood, and secured a position on the state supreme
court. 22 In the 1830s, Catron supported Jackson in the major struggles
of his presidential administration. He distinguished himself as a
strong opponent of nullification within the state, offering advice to
Jackson and advocating the use of force to stop South Carolina's
possible secession. 23 He also repudiated, in State v. Foreman,24 the
20. See John R. Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait, 3
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (1959) (citing Fred Rodell, who attributed all of Chief Justice Taney's
decisions to his big-plantation birth and background).
21. HUEBNER, SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION at 41-43.
22. Id. at 43-44; Burton W. Folsom II, The Politics of Elites: Prominence and Party in
Davidson County, Tennessee, 1835-1861, 39 J. S. HIST. 359, 361 (1973).
23. Paul H. Bergeron, Tennessee's Response to the Nullification Crisis, 39 J. S. HIST. 23, 33
(1973).
24. 16 Tenn. 256, 272-74 (1835).
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Marshall Court's ruling in Worcester v. Georgia25 that states could not
extend their laws over Indian territories within their boundaries.
While proving to be a loyal follower of Jackson with such actions,
Catron also articulated during his years on Tennessee's high court a
jurisprudential vision in both public and private law that ultimately
would mesh well with that of his colleagues on the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Catron's 1835 ruling in Foreman provides the best starting
point from which to examine the public law dimensions of this vision.26
In 1833, Tennessee's legislature passed a law extending its
jurisdiction into the portion of the Cherokee Nation that lay within its
boundaries. Although he had upheld Indian treaty rights in the past,2
7
Catron defended the state's action as incident to its sovereignty.
Tennessee's jurisdiction over Cherokee territory, Catron argued,
rested on the law of conquest, which constituted part of international
law when European powers colonized the Americas. "By this rule, the
Indians found on this continent, the Cherokees inclusive, were allowed
no political rights, save at the discretion of the European power that
colonized the country."28 The rights of conquest then passed from the
colonial government of England to the State of North Carolina after
the Revolution, to the territorial government established under the
Southwest Ordinance, and finally to the State of Tennessee, which
could exercise those rights at its discretion. No treaty with the
Cherokee, moreover, could extinguish those rights, for the federal
government possessed neither the right to establish a government
25. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
26. My interest in Foreman centers on the doctrinal arguments that Catron deployed in the
course of his opinion. I am aware that students of the Tennessee Supreme Court find Foreman to
be a sort of legal about-face for Catron. See TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF
REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 198-
233 (2002) (providing an extensive account of the decision); HUEBNER, SOUTHERN JUDICIAL
TRADITION at 59-60 (acknowledging the decision's inconsistencies with prior decisions and
suggesting possible explanations therefore); Brown, supra note 12, at 57-60 (quoting one
commentator who concluded that Catron's opinion "seem[ed] less one of law than of the
rationalization of power"). Although there is no question that Catron had previously upheld
Cherokee property rights, see McIntosh v. Cleveland, 15 Tenn. 46, 52 (1834) (Catron, J.,
concurring) (concurring with the majority's holding that driving Indians from their lands did not
constitute a voluntary removal); Jones' Lessee v. Evans, 13 Tenn. 323, 328 (1833) (Catron, J.,
dissenting on other grounds) (same), I am not convinced that Foreman constituted as sharp a
break as these scholars imply. Cases like McIntosh and Jones' Lessee involved Cherokee who had
decided to live as citizens of Tennessee on land located outside of the Cherokee Nation. Decisions
upholding those claims seem to embrace a completely different set of concerns than those
involved in Foreman, and they seem, to my mind, reconcilable. I will not undertake that project
here.
27. See supra note 26.
28. Foreman, 16 Tenn. at 335.
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inside a state nor the authority to regulate a state's internal policy.
Under the Constitution, the federal government could regulate
commerce with the Cherokee and nothing else. Matters of criminal
jurisdiction-such as the murder conviction at issue in Foreman-lay
with the state.
29
Two elements of this argument deserve notice. First, Catron's
position maximized the discretionary authority of state legislatures.
Although he observed that both federal powers to create treaties30 and
to regulate commerce with Native Americans 31 came into play, Catron
employed the rhetoric of state sovereignty to dismiss those
considerations. The authority to negotiate treaties, he argued,
conferred no power for Congress to legislate where it ordinarily could
not. A treaty, therefore, could not empower Congress to pass
legislation extending to criminal cases occurring on Cherokee land in
Tennessee.32 The power to regulate commerce also conferred no such
authority; it embraced "the government of navigation and
intercourse"3 3 and extended beyond the mere "traffic, . . .buying and
selling, or the interchange of commodities." 34 It had to, because
"[u]nder a different construction, one [s]tate might load another with
imposts and taxes on the passage of goods and persons, ruinous to the
interior."35 This power did not extend to a general authority over
criminal offenses. Tennessee held that authority. The state had long
declined to exercise that power, but it did so now:
The Cherokees are overrun by the whites, their government is broken up and
suppressed by Georgia, their few people within our limits are so scattered and feeble, as
not only to be incapable of self-government, but they are wholly incapable of protecting
themselves, or the whites among them, against individual depredation upon persons or
property. Their's [sic] is, emphatically, a land without law, if our laws do not reach it...
36
This interpretation of the Constitution effectively created a void that
only an assertive sovereign state could fill.
Catron's vision of governmental power, at least in public law
cases, proved to be fundamentally amoral. In a letter defending his
opinion against the criticism of his future U.S. Supreme Court
29. Id. at 335-36.
30. Id. at 312-13.
31. Id. at 315-16.
32. Id. at 315 (arguing that neither Congress nor the treaty power could take away
jurisdiction because it belonged to the states).
33. Id. at 316.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 319.
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colleague Justice John McLean, Catron explained that a judge ought
not to view the law as "a system of ethical philosophy."37 Rather, one
should approach it as set of rules "to maintain the ancient state of
things regardless of the sanctions giving rise to it."38 He made a
similar point in Foreman. Catron considered the doctrine of conquest
upon which he drew to be "in conflict with our religion, and with our
best convictions of a refined and sound morality."39 Yet he felt
compelled to invoke it: "[O]ur individual titles to lands, from the
Atlantic to the western Missouri line, depend upon its firm and
unquailing support, regardless of its origin.... Time and necessity
have lent it their sanction; it is the law of the land."40 Catron's stance
exposed a desire not to second-guess legislatures on the grounds of
substantive policy. As he stated in another case, his court had no
authority "to enquire for the motive operating on the Legislature."
41
The Justices' business was to determine only whether a law was
constitutional and, therefore, binding. If a statute conflicts "with the
laws of the United States, [we] reject it as void; if not, we must enforce
it."42 Indeed, he even at times struck down laws with which he agreed
personally.
43
Catron's amoral stance, like that of the Taney Court on which
he would later serve, extended only to cases of public law. His opinions
in private law cases often could be charged with moral sensibility as
he demanded that individuals govern themselves as sovereigns and
accept full responsibility for their actions. 44 When a taxpayer sued his
local sheriff to recover money he had overpaid (because he calculated
his bill on the basis of a tax law that previously had been declared
unconstitutional by the state supreme court), Catron wrote an opinion
explaining why the litigant could not recover.45 His "payment ... was
37. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 18.
38. Id.
39. Foreman, 16 Tenn. at 333.
40. Id.
41. Pettyjohn v. Akers, 14 Tenn. 448, 451 (1834).
42. Id.
43. E.g., Marr v. Enloe, 9 Tenn. 452, 458 (1830). In this case, Catron struck down as
unconstitutional an 1827 Tennessee law permitting county courts to assess taxes in their own
county. That policy ran contrary to a constitutional provision that every 100 acres in the state be
taxed at the same rate as every other. Catron believed the provision to be absurd but argued that
the people would have to alter the Tennessee Constitution and the legislature could not do so
through an ordinary act of legislation. Id.
44. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 37-44 (discussing several cases in which the Taney Court
Justices forced the litigants to "adhere to the letter of their obligations to prevent disorder," even
if the results seemed harsh).
45. Dickins v. Jones, 14 Tenn. 483, 483 (1834).
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voluntary," and he knew of the law's unconstitutionality when he paid
his bill.46 The majority believed "that money paid under a knowledge
of all the facts cannot be recovered on the ground that the plaintiff
mistook the law."
47
Most of these rulings demanded that litigants stand by the
obligations they incurred in the market. Thus, when Scruggs agreed to
pay Gass for a load of bacon with notes drawn on a particular bank
(which neither party knew had failed), the court ruled that Gass must
accept the worthless paper as payment. 48 "To adopt a different rule,"
Catron wrote, "would end in much litigation and confusion."
49
Likewise, a lawyer who had worked on a case that he had been hired
to litigate could demand payment even if the dispute were settled
without litigation.50 The client, Catron wrote, "was bound in law and
morals to pay... because the counsel had faithfully performed his
part of the contract."51 Only in extremely clear cases of fraud did
Catron depart from this stance. He once set aside a contract for the
sale of a plantation that sold for about half of its appraised value. 52
Catron's initial inclination was to let the agreement stand, but the
seller was grotesquely drunk at the time of the bargain and
apparently remained so constantly until his death a few months
later.53 The purchaser had exploited the situation unfairly to the
detriment of the seller's family.54
In most cases, however, intoxication provided no excuse
because the court tended to place a high standard of self-control on the
litigants who came before it. In 1827, for example, Catron joined a
rather preachy opinion 55 (so much so that the author apologized for its
moralistic tone56) that insisted a drunk person take responsibility for
46. Id. at 484.
47. Id.
48. Scruggs v. Gass, 16 Tenn. 175, 177 (1835).
49. Id.
50. McClain v. Williams, 16 Tenn. 230, 232 (1835) (holding that the client who had hired an
attorney to represent him in an ejectment action was bound to pay him for his services, even
though the client settled the matter on his own).
51. Id.
52. Hotchkiss v. Fortson, 15 Tenn. 66, 71 (1834).
53. Id. at 73.
54. Id. (noting that the "mind shrinks from an injustice so gross").
55. Cornwell v. State, 8 Tenn. 147 (1827).
56. Id. at 159:
Parts of this opinion may appear to partake of the character of a moral
lecture. It is believed to be called for by the occasion. We have seen before us
this day, three fellow beings who are about to be ushered into the presence of
their maker, two of whom may probably attribute his unnatural exit from
this world, to the immoderate use of ardent spirits.
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all actions taken while inebriated. The court was expressing its
frustration at having to reject, for the second time in a single term, a
plea of alcohol-induced insanity as a defense against a murder
conviction. 57 Catron's most forceful expression of the importance of
self-control came in 1829 when he explained why lawyers would be
disbarred for dueling.58 "We are told this is only a kind of honorable
homicide," Catron wrote. 59 "The law knows it as a wicked and wilful
[sic] murder .... [W]e are placed here firmly and fearlessly to execute
the laws of the land-not visionary codes of honor, framed to subserve
the purposes of destruction."60 That destruction came about because
the practice of dueling allowed weak men to be governed by "blind and
reckless passion"61 or by "the giddy assertions ... of the community." 62
What Catron demanded was a state bar composed of men possessing
"moral couragef and fearless firmness" who could respond to
perceived insults with calmness and through negotiation. 63
Catron's tenure on the Tennessee Supreme Court ended in
1836. That year he supported Martin Van Buren for President.
Tennessee by that time had become a seat of Whig opposition and the
home of Hugh Lawson White, one of the three Whig candidates who
ran against Jackson's hand-picked successor. White's allies took
revenge on Catron by forcing him off the court. 64 By that point,
however, Catron had articulated fully a jurisprudential vision that
both affirmed the people's authority to rule themselves through the
legislatures and forced individuals to govern themselves by meeting
the obligations they incurred in the market. Catron's removal from the
bench also freed him to campaign vigorously for his candidate, and on
his last day as President, Jackson rewarded him for his efforts by
elevating Catron to the U.S. Supreme Court. 65
57. Id. at 155.
58. Smith v. State, 9 Tenn. 228 (1829).
59. Id. at 237 (emphasis in original).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 233.
62. Id. at 234.
63. Id. at 236. But see ALLEN, supra note 15, at 41 (discussing dueling as an affirmation of
self-control).
64. See HUEBNER, SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION at 63-64 (describing how Tennessee's
constitution allowed the legislature to elect members of the state's supreme court and replace the
unpopular Catron).
65. Id. at 64-65.
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II. SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOHN CATRON
Catron joined a Court on which he was largely overshadowed
by his colleagues, yet he was not necessarily outclassed. He was a
competent judge, although he, on average, wrote fewer opinions than
the rest of his colleagues. 66 Part of that overshadowing came about as
a consequence not only of Catron's tendency to specialize in common
law matters, but also because the newly appointed Chief Justice
Taney, who had a jurisprudential vision that was very similar to
Catron's, tended to take the lead in constitutional cases. Thus, Catron
had little need to stake out his own ground in those matters. He also
showed little inclination to align himself with the Court's regular
dissenters. He did not share the nationalist sentiments of Justice
Joseph Story; the nationalism, moralism, and concern for individual
rights expressed by Justice John McLean; or even-except for a brief
period in the 1850s-the rigid states' rights ideology of Justice Peter
V. Daniel. 67 Catron thus fell into the Court's mainstream, and his
published opinions underscore his role as a common law specialist and
his commitment to the Taney Court's Jacksonian jurisprudence.
A. The Nature of Catron's Work
For the most part, Catron's Supreme Court opinions attracted
little attention from outside observers. He generally spoke for the
Court in property disputes that interested few people beyond the
litigants involved. A significant exception to this trend occurred in
1852 when Catron issued an opinion in Gaines v. Relf,68 a case that
formed part of Myra Clark Gaines's long-running effort to claim a
substantial inheritance from the estate of her father, Daniel Clark.
69
Speaking for a divided Court, Catron ruled that Gaines held no claim
to the estate in question because she was the issue of a bigamous
marriage. Gaines's mother already was married to another man when
she married Clark. 70 Because the case's details were often salacious
(Catron expressed regrets that the Court could not rule "without
66. See HUEBNER, TANEY COURT at 96 tbl. 2.2 (indicating that other than Justice Wayne,
Justice Catron averaged the fewest number of opinions per term on the Taney Court with only
7.5).
67. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 30-35 (discussing the varied opinions of the Taney Court's
internal critics).
68. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472 (1852).
69. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 17 (providing a full, scholarly treatment of the
whole affair); The Romance of the Great Gaines Case: A Life-Time Lawsuit, 12 PUTNAM'S MAG.
201 (1868) (providing a brief account of the dispute).
70. Gaines, 53 U.S. at 539.
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making exposures that would most willingly have been avoided" 71),
the Gaines case attracted a great deal of attention. 72 Aside from this
interest, however, Gaines differed little from the types of opinions
Catron wrote during his tenure on the Court.
His opinions typically exhibited little conceptual ambition and
involved careful, detailed reviews of the litigants' claims. In Gaines,
for example, Catron painstakingly examined the daughter's claim that
her father's previous marriage had been void at the time of the second
marriage. The Justice dismissed witnesses as incompetent 73 and
evidence as hearsay. 74 He also concluded that Gaines's mother's
decision to sue her previous husband for bigamy in 1806 constituted
telling evidence that she was still married in 1802 or 1803 when she
purportedly wed Clark.75
Catron had used a similar approach years before in Bank of the
United States v. Lee,76 in which the Court considered whether
Elizabeth Lee, the wife of Richard Bland Lee, was liable for a debt
that her husband had incurred before his death. In 1809, Lee gave his
wife a piece of land in exchange for her dower lands, 77 although Lee
continued to represent himself as the owner and even used the land as
collateral for a debt incurred in 1816.78 Catron, speaking for the Court,
examined whether the 1809 deed was fraudulent, 79 whether the wife
had knowledge of the 1816 deed of trust,80 and whether her silence
about her husband's use of her land proved that she did not own it.81
He answered each in the negative and upheld her claim to the land.
Decisions like Gaines and Lee constituted a significant portion
of the Supreme Court's workload, and Catron's approach did little to
make him stand out among his colleagues. Nevertheless, one aspect of
his work in such cases deserves comment: his common law and equity
rulings usually involved claims arising in the Old Southwest, an area
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Romance of the Great Gaines Case, supra note 69; Summary, N.Y.
EVANGELIST, Mar. 11, 1852, at 43; Washington Correspondence, N.Y. EVANGELIST, Feb. 12, 1852,
at 27; Letter from Benjamin Robbins Curtis to George Ticknor Curtis (Feb. 29, 1852) (on file with
author) (discussing the Gaines case).
73. Gaines, 53 U.S. at 539.
74. Id. at 533.
75. Id. at 512.
76. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 107 (1839).
77. Id. at 113.
78. Id. at 111.
79. Id. at 116 (finding that the deed was not fraudulent).
80. Id. at 118 (arguing that she may have known of the deed, but noting that there was no
proof that she did).
81. Id. at 119-22 (finding that the wife's silence did not render her responsible).
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characterized by rapid squatter settlement combined with large land
grants that often were issued under French or Spanish law. Catron's
years of experience on the Tennessee Supreme Court left him well-
suited for these types of cases.8 2 When it needed to determine who had
a greater right to a piece of land granted by France or Spain, the
Court often turned to Catron. In 1850, for example, Catron examined
two overlapping Spanish land grants in southern Louisiana.8 3 The
first provided an amount of property large enough to accommodate a
colony of 500 wheat farmers in the marshy lands of the area. The
second, relatively more recent, grant secured a location suitable for a
flour mill and was located within the boundaries of the first grant.
8 4
After examining the claims, Catron ruled that the second grant-
which had precise terms that the grantee met-constituted a true
grant,8 5 while the earlier one, for a variety of reasons, never conveyed
any title to the land in question.86
Much of Catron's work on the Court required him to handle
these types of cases. Consequently, Catron developed a commanding
knowledge of the law of Spanish grants, and he became adept at
determining whether a grantee had met the requirements conveying
title to a particular piece of land.8 7 None of these cases, however,
amounted to any memorable part of the Taney Court's work, and the
Tennessee Justice often labored in obscurity. Yet, in the course of this
work, Catron occasionally issued rulings that demonstrated his full
embrace of the jurisprudential framework characterizing the Taney
Court.
B. Justice Catron and Jacksonian Jurisprudence
During his tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, Catron had
fewer opportunities to articulate his commitment to Jacksonian
jurisprudence than he had on the Tennessee Supreme Court. A
number of factors explain this development. First, the jurisdictional
82. See HUEBNER, SOUTHERN JUDIcIAL TRADITION at 53-55 (discussing Catron's decisions
involving squatter settlement); see also Brown, supra note 12, at 23-27 (discussing the
Tennessee Supreme Court's handling of real property cases during the period of Catron's tenure).
83. United States v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 609 (1850).
84. Id. at 640-47 (quoting the grants in full).
85. Id. at 651.
86. See id. at 651-53 (discussing the "manifest inconsistency of assuming that both grants
were in full property").
87. See, e.g., Villalobos v. United States, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 541, 557 (1850) (rejecting claim
based on a Spanish grant because the land was never surveyed); United States v. Wiggins, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 334, 351-52 (1840) (rejecting a claim based on a Spanish grant because the
requirement that the land be settled and improved for ten years had not been met).
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rules governing the federal courts limited the types of common law
cases that came before the Court. None of the types of cases that
provided Catron with a chance to moralize on the Tennessee Supreme
Court-such as those involving dueling 88 -ever came before him on
the federal bench. Likewise, he had limited opportunities to write
opinions in constitutional cases because Justices like Taney, Story,
and Curtis tended to dominate the issues involved. Even so, Catron
managed to speak out enough to demonstrate that he fell squarely
within the Taney Court's jurisprudential mainstream.
There are two dimensions in which the Taney Court worked to
facilitate popular sovereignty.8 9 In its common law decisions, the
Court strove to impose an individuated version of self-rule that
centered on forcing people to stand by the obligations they incurred in
the market (thus setting the expectation that potential litigants
govern their affairs in a manner befitting sovereigns).90 Most of
Catron's common law decisions-focused as they were on questions
surrounding the validity of particular land grants-did not perform
this function. At one point, however, he did write an opinion forcing a
litigant to live with the consequences of accepting an invalid bank
note.91 A bank previously had rejected the note, marking it
accordingly, and the note's holder subsequently passed it on to
others.9 2 Catron ruled that later holders were bound to know what the
note's marks meant: "Failing to be thus diligent, they must abide by
the misfortune their negligence imposed."
93
Catron participated more fully, however, in the second
dimension of the Court's facilitation of popular sovereignty: the effort
to impose a regime of collective self-rule by permitting state
legislatures a maximum degree of discretion within the constitutional
order.94 Indeed, Catron had a tendency to emphasize the presence of
sharp limits on federal authority. In 1845, Catron, speaking for the
Court, refused to strike down a New Orleans city ordinance that
barred the display of a corpse within a Catholic church.95 Plaintiff
Bernard Permoli argued that the ordinance violated the religious
88. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
89. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 9-67 (discussing the Taney Court's attempts to facilitate
popular sovereignty).
90. See id. at 37-45.
91. See Fowler v. Brantly, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 319, 320 (1840) (noting that customary usage of
such a note made it likely the note holder knew and understood its reduced value).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 321.
94. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 15-30.
95. Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 610 (1845).
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liberty guaranteed to him by the First Amendment.96 Catron quickly
dismissed the argument, concluding: "The Constitution makes no
provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their
religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: nor is
there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States
in this respect on the states." 9
7
Catron made a similar point a few years later in Mills v. St.
Clair County.9s The case centered on whether the creation of a road
and ferry line under an 1839 Illinois law violated the Obligation of
Contracts Clause99 because the state already had granted an exclusive
right to the route to another party. 100 The Tennessee Justice dismissed
this argument because the Court found the state's prior legislation
governing this ferry line to be ambiguous, and according to prior
precedent, any ambiguity went against the grantees in favor of the
public. 10 1 The holder of the prior claim, however, also contended that
the state had abused its eminent domain power by taking more land
than was necessary for a road and ferry. 10 2 Although he agreed that
abuse of such authority was a matter of concern, Catron retorted that
the Court could not respond:
It is not an invasion and illegal seizure of private property on pretence of exercising the
right of eminent domain ... that gives this [C]ourt jurisdiction; such law, and the acts
done under it, are not, "the violation of a contract," in the sense and meaning of the
Constitution. 103
Accordingly, Catron argued that only state courts rightly possessed
jurisdiction to handle such issues. Catron maintained that if the Court
intervened in this case, "all state laws ... under whose sanction roads,
ferries, and bridges are established, would be subject to our
supervision." 10 4 The end result would be that "a vast mass of
municipal powers.., would be taken from the states, and exercised by
the general government, through the instrumentality of this
[C]ourt."'105
96. Id. at 609.
97. Id.
98. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 569 (1850).
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
100. Mills, 49 U.S. at 569-74.
101. Id. at 581-83; see also Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 544 (1837) (setting out the rule later applied in Mills).
102. Mills, 49 U.S. at 583-84.
103. Id. at 585.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 585-86.
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Catron's argument here drew upon one of the most significant
aspects of the Taney Court's identity: the insistence that the Supreme
Court not usurp the policymaking roles of other actors within the
political system.10 6 Catron's opinion in United States v. Boisdor6
10 7
illustrates the point. In that case, the Court denied the validity of a
title resting on a Spanish land grant because the terms of the grant
had not been fulfilled and the grant's boundaries had been poorly
surveyed.108 The first point is of little relevance here, 109 but Catron's
comments on the second point proved revealing. If the survey did not
effectively mark the boundaries of a particular grant, the Court could
not recognize a complete title. "Our action is judicial,"1 0 Catron wrote.
"We have no authority to exercise political jurisdiction and to grant, as
the governors of Spain had, and'as Congress has." ' If the Court did
otherwise, he said, then it would be exercising the granting power and
transforming by its decree public land into private holdings. 1 2 "[O]urs
would be an exercise of political jurisdiction, and not a judicial
decree,"113 and Catron refused to take on that role.
During that same year, Catron took a similar approach when
he upheld a conviction of a man who had cut timber on federal land in
violation of a congressional statute reserving certain trees for naval
use. 114 Although the statute's title limited the penalty to persons
taking timber reserved for naval use, 115 the enabling clause employed
more general language. 116 Catron concluded that the removal of any
106. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 15-19 (discussing the Taney Court's reticence to openly
formulate policy).
107. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 63 (1850).
108. Id. at 63.
109. Indeed, this case closely resembled the numerous other cases dealing with Spanish land
grants that Catron heard during his tenure on the Court. See supra text accompanying notes 83-
87.




114. United States v. Briggs, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 351 (1850).
115. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 66, § 1, 4 Stat. 472, 472 ("An Act to provide for the punishment
of offenses in cutting, destroying, or removing live oak and other timber or trees reserved for
naval purposes.").
116. The relevant clause read:
If any person or persons shall cut .. .or cause or procure to be removed ...
any live oak or red cedar trees, or other timber, from any other lands of the
United States ... with intent to export, dispose of, use, or employ the same in
any manner whatsoever, other than for the use of the navy of the United
States; every such person or persons so offending, on conviction thereof...
shall . . . pay a fine not less than triple the value of the tree or trees or timber
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timber constituted a punishable offense. 117 In much the same way as
he did in Boisdor , Catron would not substitute the Court's judgment
for that of Congress.
Like Catron's common law rulings, none of these rulings
particularly stood out. His ruling in Mills did little more than apply a
doctrine the Court already had established, and his opinion broke no
new ground. His opinions in Boisdorg and Briggs appeared in cases
with very little impact. Even his ruling on the First Amendment
merely restated a rule set out previously by the Marshall Court.118
What these rulings demonstrated, however, was Catron's continuing
embrace of the Taney Court's larger jurisprudential framework, and
this acquiescence by Catron and those colleagues that shared his
inclinations exerted a decisive influence on the Taney Court's
jurisprudence.
III. JUSTICE CATRON, DISSENTING AND CONCURRING
Catron's willingness to accommodate himself to the Taney
Court's jurisprudential vision did not mean that he always agreed
with his colleagues. Catron held his own views on particular issues,
and he was not afraid to speak his mind. Indeed, Catron dissented on
average about twice as often as Chief Justice Taney, although not
quite as frequently as Justice McLean and not nearly as much as
Justices Daniel or Campbell.11 9 Yet, even in those cases, Catron rarely
stood out. Two reasons explain this result. First, Catron often offered
concurring or dissenting opinions on highly technical issues that
offered little challenge to the Court's general framework. As a
consequence, his separate opinions fail to be memorable. Second,
Catron often put forth his most forceful dissenting and concurring
so cut, destroyed, or removed, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding twelve
months.
Id.
117. In Catron's words:
The caption of the act would indicate that timber reserved for naval purposes
was meant to be protected by this mode, and none other. But the enacting
clause is general, and not restricted to live-oak or red-cedar, nor to timber
specially reserved for naval purposes; and therefore cutting and using oak
and hickory trees is indictable; and so the cutting and using of any other
description of timber trees from the public lands would be equally indictable.
Briggs, 50 U.S. at 355; see also ALLEN, supra note 15, at 16 (discussing Briggs in the context of
Taney Court jurisprudence).
118. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that the
Constitution's Fifth Amendment prohibition against government taking of property without
compensation does not apply to state legislation).
119. HUEBNER, TANEY COURT at 68.
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opinions-in which he aired serious differences with his colleagues-
when the Court fragmented deeply and produced numerous opinions.
During these occasions, his voice often became lost in the cacophony.
Catron's contributions to decisions such as Swift v. Tyson,' 20 The
Passenger Cases,121 Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co. v. Debolt,122 and
Dred Scott v. Sandford123 illustrate this aspect of his work.
A good example of Catron's break with the Court on a highly
technical matter, which in no way challenged the Court's larger
jurisprudential outlook, occurred in his concurrence in Swift v.
Tyson.124 In Swift, the Court, speaking through Justice Joseph Story,
issued two principal rulings. The first was that a preexisting debt
constituted valid consideration to make one a bona fide holder of a
negotiable instrument. 25 When Story issued this ruling, this question
was by no means settled among American courts.' 26 But this part of
the opinion paled in long-term importance next to Swift's second
ruling: state judicial decisions did not constitute law within the
meaning of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act, 27 and the federal courts
therefore were free to shape their own commercial common law. 28
Commentators long have found this case extremely puzzling because
its nationalistic overtones seemingly ran contrary to the general drift
of Taney Court jurisprudence, 129 and the Swift doctrine ultimately
covered a sweeping array of legal questions. 30
120. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
121. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
122. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1853).
123. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
124. 41 U.S. at 18-23,
125. Id. at 19-20.
126. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 55 (discussing the division in the New York courts).
127. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 ("[Tlhe laws of the several states...
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply.").
128. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19 (arguing that judicial decisions constitute merely evidence of
law, not the law itself).
129. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 15, at 52-67 (explaining Swift as an ideological fulcrum in
Taney Court jurisprudence); TONY A. FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE
CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 4-17 (1981) (explaining Swift in the context of antebellum
business practices); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1790-1860,
at 245-52 (1977) (explaining Swift as part of a judicial effort to impose a capitalist legal order on
the United States); R. Randall Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in American Legal History: A
Commentary on Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1790-1860 and the Common
Law in America, 53 IND. L. J. 449, 473 (1978) (explaining Swift as a product of antebellum
common law assumptions); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law
of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1952), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 792 (1953) (explaining Swift
as a product of antebellum international-law assumptions); William LaPiana, Swift v. Tyson and
the Brooding Omnipresence in the Sky: An Investigation of the Idea of Law in Antebellum
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Yet only Catron issued a separate opinion in the case, and he
did so on a very narrow point. Justice Story had argued in the course
of his opinion that allowing negotiable instruments to be used to settle
debts was fundamental to the banking industry. 131 Justice Story
offered a question for those who advocated a contrary position:
What... would become of that large class of cases, where new notes are given by the
same or by other parties, by way of renewal or security to banks, in lieu of old securities
discounted by them, which have arrived at maturity? Probably more than one-half of all
bank transactions in our country ... are of this nature.
1 32
Although Catron agreed generally with the rule Justice Story
invoked, he could not accept this part of the opinion.1 33 State courts
were divided on the issue, and since the question had not been part of
Swift's record, they probably would not follow Justice Story's opinion.
Catron thus thought his brethren should wait until a proper case
came before the Court to pronounce such a rule-at which point "the
decision of it either way... probably, would, and I think ought to
settle it.' 134 Catron's argument exerted little influence with his
colleagues, and it has not captured the attention of scholars. But the
Tennessee Justice's break from the Court in Swift revealed a pattern
in his work. Catron regularly challenged his colleagues on numerous
issues-property cases, 135  equity, 136  jurisdiction,1 37  contract,'
3 8
America, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 771, 830-32 (1986) (explaining Swift as the product of
antebellum legal assumptions); Note, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE L.J. 284, 296-97 (1969)
(explaining Swift as judicial response to the movement to codify common law that still attempted
to avoid conflict between the state and federal judicial systems).
130. TONY A. FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 110-12, 119 n.60 (1979) (arguing that Swift covered about twenty-six areas of law at
the time it was overturned).
131. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-20.
132. Id. at 20.
133. Id. at 23 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553, 617 (1860) (Catron, J., dissenting)
(breaking with the Court over a point of Spanish divorce law); Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 353, 427-29 (1840) (Catron, J., dissenting) (breaking with the Court over who could
cede property in Mobile at this time); Lattimer's Lessee v. Poteet, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 4, 17-18
(1840) (Catron, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (agreeing with his brethren that the
lower court had given erroneous instructions, but disagreeing where the Treaties of Tellico and
Holston fixed the line of settlement); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 462-70 (1838)
(Catron, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (concurring, but rejecting the principles on
which the Court based a Spanish land grant case).
136. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 210, 279-81 (1840) (Catron,
J., dissenting) (citing numerous objections to the Court's handling of equity rules); Jenkins v.
Pye, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 241, 255-63 (1838) (Catron, J., concurring) (setting out what he deemed to
be a proper understanding of equity rules).
137. See, e.g., Moore v. Brown, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 414, 430-36 (1850) (Catron, J., dissenting)
(stating his belief that the parties wrongfully took advantage of jurisdictional rules to get before
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procedure, 139  patents, 140  and statutory interpretation14 1-yet he
generally did so on such narrow or technical grounds that his opinions
rarely stood out as memorable.
Catron's inability to distinguish himself from his colleagues
also was manifested in his constitutional opinions-except in those
decisions in which the Tennessee Justice's obscurity was more a
consequence of disappearing in a sea of voices rather than one of
narrowness and technicality. Generally, one of Catron's primary
constitutional concerns appeared buried in decisions featuring
multiple opinions. Catron took very seriously the principle that every
state was equal to the others and that each possessed the same rights
and authority. On the Tennessee Supreme Court, he had drawn on
this principle in State v. Foreman142 to justify a state's removal policy
on the ground that other states were not required to endure self-
governing Indian nations within their boundaries. 143 He also had
invoked the principle in Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs,144 in which he
upheld an act of manumission on the ground that the newly freed
subjects settle outside the United States. Catron took this position in
part because the principle of state equality suggested that no state
possessed a right to force upon another a population that it did not
want. 145
On the U.S. Supreme Court, Catron pronounced this position in
Permoli v. New Orleans, in which he rejected federal protection for
religious practices discouraged by state action.1 46 That case implicated
more than just the First Amendment; 147 the plaintiff also had argued
the Court); N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 393-
95 (1848) (Catron, J., concurring) (agreeing that this case fell into federal admiralty jurisdiction
but arguing that the issue was one of tort rather than contract); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 300, 338 (1838) (Catron, J., expressing no opinion) (addressing whether circuit courts had
jurisdiction to issue foreign attachments).
138. See, e.g., Bradley v. Wash., Alexandria, & Georgetown Steam Packet Co., 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 89, 104-06 (1839) (Catron, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court over the acceptability
of an oral modification to a written contract).
139. See, e.g., Clements v. Berry, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 398, 412-13 (1850) (Catron, J.,
dissenting) (addressing the point at which a judgment attaches according to Tennessee law).
140. See, e.g., Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S (11 How.) 587, 608-09 (1850) (Catron, J., dissenting)
(speaking for Justices Taney, Daniel, and Grier, rejecting the Court's holding that a patent could
cover more than one invention).
141. See, e.g., Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 265, 266-77 (1843) (Catron, J., dissenting)
(finding that the Court misinterpreted a badly drawn statute).
142. 16 Tenn. 256 (1835).
143. Id. at 316-19.
144. 14 Tenn. 119, 161 (1834).
145. Id. at 157-59.
146. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609-10 (1845).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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that the religious protections contained in the Northwest Ordinance 148
(which, with the exception of the restriction against slavery, 149 had
been extended to every territory south of the Ohio River 150) barred
religious discrimination. Catron, however, made short work of that
argument. Whatever force the Ordinance possessed, such force ended
when Louisiana became a state and entered the union on an equal
footing with its peers, Catron wrote. 151 Congress no longer could place
any requirements on Louisiana beyond those contained in the
Constitution itself.152 Permoli attracted little notice, but Catron made
the argument again a few years later in Strader v. Graham.153 This
time, Catron rejected the argument that the Ordinance's antislavery
provisions had freed a group of enslaved musicians whose master had
permitted them to travel into Ohio and other free states. 154 Just as he
had done in Permoli, Catron insisted that the Ordinance lost any force
it had when a territory that had developed under its governance joined
the Union. 155 His argument, however, was overshadowed by that of
Chief Justice Taney, 156 who expressed an argument very similar to
Catron's, and by Justice McLean, 15 7 who took pains to defend the
Ordinance's antislavery provisions. In general, only Taney's (and
sometimes McLean's) contributions to Strader have received any
notice. 158
Catron's tendency to get drowned out among the voices of his
colleagues emerged vividly in The Passenger Cases, in which he aired
his state equality argument. 159 In that decision, a Court so deeply
148. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.(a), art. I.
149. Id. at 53 n.(a), art. VI ("[Tihere shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in
the.., territory."); see also Act of Apr. 2, 1790, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 106, 108 (allowing for North
Carolina's ceding land to the United States "provided always, That no regulations made or to be
made by Congress, shall tend to emancipate slaves").
150. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 123 (organizing the Southwest Territory along the
terms specified by the North Carolina cession).
151. Permoli, 44 U.S. at 610.
152. Id.
153. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 98 (1850) (Catron, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
154. Id. at 98-99.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 94-97 (citing Permoli).
157. Id. at 97.
158. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 92-93 (discussing Strader without mention of Justice
Catron); see also FEHRENBACHER, supra note 14, at 234, 260-62; PAUL FINKELMAN, AN
IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND CoMITY 271-74 (1981) (same); Wiececk, supra
note 18, at 34, 53-54 (1978) (mentioning only Catron's opinion in Permoli during discussion of
Strader).
159. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
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fragmented that no single Justice could speak for it ruled that states
held no constitutional authority to levy a tax on healthy immigrants
before they could disembark from a port within the state's
jurisdiction. 16 0 A group of four Justices dissented (in three separate
opinions) and argued that this power was incident to state police
power and constituted part of the states' authority over their internal
populations. 161 Catron sided with the majority and ruled that the anti-
immigration laws simply constituted a tax on foreign commerce, and
therefore were unconstitutional. 162 In the course of that argument,
however, Catron suggested that such anti-immigrant laws treated
other states unfairly. "Some states may be more desirous than others
that immigrants from Europe should come and settle themselves
within their limits; and in this respect no one State can rightfully
claim the power of thwarting by its own authority the established
policy of all the States united."' 63 Just as Catron's vision of state
equality demanded the colonization of newly freed blacks, 164 his vision
in this instance demanded a national immigration policy, one that
"opened the door widely and invited the subjects of other countries
to ... come to the United States, and seek here new homes for
themselves and their families."' 65 Whether individual states agreed
with that policy, Catron argued, was of no concern to the Court. 66 But
this argument, like most of his arguments, was lost in the flurry of
opinions produced by his colleagues.
Many of Catron's other opinions suffered a similar fate. His
argument in Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Debolt16 7 provides a
good example. Debolt was one of three cases involving an attempt by
Ohio to abrogate favorable taxation provisions it had inserted into the
charters of banking corporations in an effort to attract businesses to
the state.168 This effort had run up against the Constitution's
Obligation of Contracts Clause 69 as interpreted by the Court in
160. Id. at 572-73.
161. Chief Justice Taney dissented along with Justices Daniel, Nelson, and Woodbury. Id. at
464-572; see ALLEN, supra note 15, at 88-89 (discussing the arguments of those Justices).
162. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 88-89. Catron also believed that Congress's passage of
naturalization legislation trumped any concurrent authority the states may have held. Id. at 89-
90.
163. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 442-43.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 144-145.
165. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 442.
166. Id. at 442-43.
167. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1853).
168. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 110-11.
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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Dartmouth College v. Woodward170 and as qualified by Proprietors of
Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge.171 This doctrine
held that corporate charters could not be altered by state legislatures
unless the charter in question contained explicit language permitting
such alterations. 172 Any ambiguity in these documents, however,
would be construed against the holders of the charter and in favor of
the public. 173 The Ohio banking charters contained no ambiguity, and
the Court ruled in the same Term as Debolt that a statute revising the
tax policy was unconstitutional. 174 (A few years later, the Court would
rule that Ohio could not revise its policy through the creation of a new
constitution. 175) Although the Court ruled in Debolt that the document
in question was not a constitutionally protected charter, Catron chose
this case to announce his rejection of Dartmouth.1 76 He found the
qualification in Charles River Bridge to be "illusory and nearly
useless" because any good lawyer could find an argument to bring a
corporate charter under the protection of the Obligation of Contracts
provision. 77 Catron's concurrence however, proved hard to digest, in
part because he spread his full argument across the Ohio Bank
decisions, and because he allowed Justices Daniel and Campbell to
speak for him at times. 178 Both factors contributed to his losing
himself in the crowd of Justices with whom he worked.
Catron's tendency to speak up only when his colleagues did and
his penchant for technicality converged in the Dred Scott case, in
which he expressed significant disagreements with the Court's
majority opinion, 179 but he did so in a manner that rendered them
difficult to digest. Catron agreed with the majority of his colleagues
that Dred Scott, an enslaved man who had been taken into free
territory covered by the antislavery provision of the Missouri
Compromise, was still a slave and that the antislavery provision was
170. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
171. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
172. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 106-07.
173. I have discussed Dartmouth and Charles River Bridge extensively elsewhere. ALLEN,
supra note 15, at 99-107.
174. Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 392 (1853).
175. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 360 (1855).
176. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 441-43 (1853) (Catron, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
177. Id. at 442.
178. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 110-14 (arguing that the Ohio bank cases are so similar
that one best approaches them as a single case).




unconstitutional.180 But his agreement ended there, and he rejected
both Chief Justice Taney's handling of questions related to Dred
Scott's citizenship and the Chief Justice's interpretation of
congressional power over the territories.181 Taney opened his ruling
with an elaborate and unabashedly racist argument, contending that
the federal courts had no jurisdiction over the case because no African-
American person, free or slave, could be a citizen of the United States,
and therefore he had no standing to maintain his suit.18 2 Catron did
not believe this issue was properly before the Court.'8 3 Scott's
purported owner, John Sandford, had raised the issue of Scott's
citizenship in the court below; the judge ruled that Scott had standing,
and Sandford did not challenge the case's procession to an
examination of the merits.18 4 By proceeding, Catron concluded,
Sandford waived his objections to jurisdiction.18 5 Catron staked out an
unassailable position for a common law court, but the pleading rules
for the federal courts, as both Taney and the dissenting Justice Curtis
argued, were different.18 6 Yet Catron may have had another reason to
dodge the issue. His opinion in Fisher's Negroes, which had held that
manumitted persons must leave the country,18 7 strongly implied that
an act of emancipation in effect created a citizen (and perhaps
conferred constitutional protection). If he still adhered to that position,
then his stance on the jurisdictional question offered an effective way
to evade its consequences.
Catron also sharply rejected Taney's interpretation of
Congress's power over the federal territories.188 The Chief Justice
essentially set aside the Court's previous holding that the
Constitution's Needful Rules Clause18 9 gave Congress a general
authority to govern the federal territories.1 90 He considered such
180. Id. at 523, 527-29. This is a simplified version of the facts involved in Dred Scott. For a
fuller version, see ALLEN, supra note 15, at 140-43, and the sources cited therein. None of the
actual events, however, were in any way relevant to Catron's argument.
181. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 527-29 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment).
182. Id. at 403-27.
183. Id. at 518-19 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 401-03; id. at 564-66 (Curtis, J., dissenting). There were numerous barriers for
Catron's arguments. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 150-51 (discussing the intricacies of
antebellum federal pleading rules).
187. Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. 119, 126 (1834).
188. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 522-29 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment).
189. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
190. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 431-52.
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governing authority an incident to the power to create new states. 191
He then insisted that the Constitution and Bill of Rights place stark
limits on the exercise of that authority and ruled that the Missouri
Compromise's antislavery provision violated the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause and was void. 192 Catron considered Taney's
argument to be overreaching-one that came closer to a statement of
policy than a judicial decision. 193 He believed, arguably incorrectly,
that the Court had accepted the Needful Rules Clause as the basis of
territorial power in the early 1850s. 194 Catron, who had sentenced
convicted criminals to death while riding circuit in the territories,
considered the implications of Taney's argument to be chilling.
195 If
the Chief Justice was correct, Catron may have been acting without
authority, and the executions he ordered would not have been legal
actions. 196
Catron responded by crafting an opinion that struck down the
Missouri Compromise without requiring a complete revision of federal
territorial policy. 197 He did so by looking to the 1803 treaty with
France that transferred the Louisiana Purchase territory to the
United States.198 That document guaranteed federal protection of the
Louisiana inhabitants' liberty, property rights, and religious
freedom. 199 And, because Louisiana possessed a plantation economy,
those property rights included extensive slaveholdings. 200 Ending
slavery within any portion of the territory, Catron argued, exceeded
Congress's authority: it could just as likely end slavery in New
Orleans as in the areas north of the 36°-30 ' line. 201 None of Catron's
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 522-29 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment).
194. Id. at 522-23 (citing Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1853)); see also ALLEN,
supra note 15, 195-96 (explaining Catron's position more fully).
195. ALLEN, supra note 15, 195-96.
196. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 522-23 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment):
It is due to myself to say, that it is asking much of a judge, who has for nearly
twenty years been exercising jurisdiction, from the western Missouri line to
the Rocky Mountains, and, on this understanding of the Constitution,
inflicting the extreme penalty of death for crimes committed where the direct
legislation of Congress was the only rule, to agree that he had been all the
while acting in mistake, and as an usurper.
197. Id. at 522-29.
198. Id. at 524.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 524-25.
201. Id. at 525.
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colleagues seemed to find this argument persuasive, although only
Justices Curtis and McLean offered a refutation.
20 2
Catron's positions in Dred Scott, however, remained true to the
jurisprudential assumptions to which he had adhered throughout his
career. His argument seemed less a declaration of policy than did
Taney's, and it probably permitted Catron to convince himself that he
was not really making law: he simply was applying the Constitution.
Moreover, as he did in his ruling in Foreman,203 Catron emphasized
that the federal government could not employ its power to create
treaties in a manner that allowed it to evade its constitutional
limits. 20 4 Congress, therefore, had no authority to prohibit the
expansion of slavery into the federal territories. 205
Yet, in these dissenting and concurring opinions, like those he
wrote when he spoke for the majority, Catron still failed to distinguish
himself from the rest of his colleagues on the Court. His dissent in
Debolt, for example, was deeply entangled with the dissents of
Justices Daniel and Campbell in related cases, and the other two
Justices effectively overshadowed him. In Dred Scott, although he
likewise expressed considerable differences with Chief Justice Taney,
Catron nevertheless agreed on the general outcome, and his opinion
became intermixed with those of the other Justices who supported the
outcome and wrote their own opinions. And his concurrence in Swift v.
Tyson was so narrow as to be hardly distinguishable from the
argument rendered by Justice Story. Such a record indeed may
explain why former Attorney General George H. Williams could
hardly recollect the Justice from Tennessee. 206
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps this obscurity embodies Justice Catron's true legacy to
the Court. His significance by no means emerged from anything
resembling judicial greatness, even if we could establish a baseline by
which to measure such a status. G. Edward White cautions against
such projects, stressing that the construction of criteria that allow for
the comparison of Justices across time may well be impossible.
20 7
Almost all of the Justices to serve on the Court, he argues, suffer
202. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 196 (discussing criticism of Catron's treaty argument).
203. State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 335-36 (1835).
204. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 527 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment).
205. Id. at 527-29.
206. Williams, supra note 1, at 296.




scholarly neglect as they become less familiar to later generations. 208
This mass of neglected judicial figures, however, probably shaped the
Court decisively by providing the backdrop against which a handful of
Justices--John Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Benjamin
Cardozo-stand out. The Taney Court had no members who proved to
be so historically prominent, but it did possess a number of figures
who overshadowed their colleagues. And Catron's rather quiet tenure
may have helped make that overshadowing possible.
One of the Taney Court's most interesting features stemmed
from the presence of three Justices who, for different reasons,
consistently expressed disagreements with the set of Jacksonian
jurisprudential assumptions that defined the Court's approach to most
legal questions. Justice Story, who spent most of his tenure serving
with John Marshall, recoiled from the increased deference accorded by
the Court to state legislatures. 209 Justice McLean objected to the
Court's subordination of individual rights, including those of African-
Americans, to the Court's proslavery conception of federalism. Justice
Daniel, in contrast, thought the Court to be insufficiently protective of
states' rights.210 At most points of his tenure, however, Catron, along
with his colleagues, rejected all of those positions. He generally
favored giving states relatively free rein in matters of policy, a
position that his rulings in Permoli and Mills v. St. Clair County
underscored. Both of those cases, moreover, showed a marked
insensitivity to individual rights. And although he flirted with Justice
Daniel's positions in the early to mid-1850s, Catron ultimately
rejected those as well, even to the point of retaining his seat on the
Court after his home state of Tennessee seceded from the Union. 211
In taking these positions, Catron displayed commitments
shared by a majority of his colleagues and most notably by Chief
Justice Taney, who was the fourth Justice to stand out during
Catron's tenure. Taney, however, did not distinguish himself because
he rejected the assumptions of Jacksonian jurisprudence; rather, he
did so because he generally embodied them. For students of the
Supreme Court, Taney's name largely has become synonymous with a
jurisprudence seeking, for the most part, to roll back federal power,
promote economic development, and defend slavery, and the Chief
Justice's name appeared on many rulings to that effect. But Taney's
208. Id.
209. See ALLEN, supra note 15, at 31-35 (discussing the positions of Justice Story and others
on the Taney Court).
210. Id.
211. HUEBNER, TANEY COURT at 67.
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ability to transform these positions into official judicial rulings
depended heavily on the support of Justices like Catron-Justices who
had spent much of their careers articulating a set of jurisprudential
assumptions quite similar to Taney's, and whose presence on the
Court, however unremarkable to later generations of scholars and
jurists, Taney could not neglect because their shared assumptions
defined the limits of the possible.

